We explore the changing politics of abortion in California, where the issue emerged years before it reached national politics. We show that at first divisions in the State Assembly on abortion were more religious than partisan. Yet the issue later became highly partisan. This shift was distinct from overall polarization, and not a result of district-level factors or "sorting" of legislators by religion into party caucuses. Instead, growing ties between new movements and parties, feminists for Democrats, and the Christian Right for the Republicans, made party affiliation supplant religion as the leading cue for legislators on abortion, impelling many incumbents to revise their positions. Our findings bring a state politics perspective to a party position change literature focused on Congress and inform a literature on representation that often sees the importance of legislators' personal characteristics as stable.
! 1!
In this paper, we explore the changing politics of abortion in California from the first votes on the issue in 1967 through the end of the 20 th century. Golden State legislators faced this issue years before Members of Congress did. At first they split more along religious than party lines. Yet abortion later became a partisan issue in California.
We examine this development using an original dataset linking legislators' abortion votes to their individual and district characteristics. We also examine the history of coalitional involvement in abortion over the same period. Finally, we compare the results of California Field polls on the changing religious and partisan alignments on abortion to find that the timing of the change in alignments is inconsistent with the idea that shifts in public opinion drove shifts in the Assembly.
While the Assembly polarized more generally in this era, the realignment on abortion was distinctive. We find little evidence that district-level factors or "sorting" of legislators by religion into party caucuses produced this change. Instead, we argue, growing ties between new movements and parties -feminists for Democrats and the Christian Right for the GOP -made party supplant religion as the chief cue for legislators on abortion, leading many to take new stands on the issue.
We show that legislators' personal backgrounds may affect their votes when an issue not promoted by parties first arises. Yet the effect of such characteristics is mediated by party coalitions. When groups focused on an issue align with parties, politicians have incentives to take stands consistent with new allies' preferences, reducing the importance of personal background and increasing that of party affiliation.
Our findings diverge from previous studies. Scholars see polarization as legislators turning from district to party cues. The issue evolution and party position ! 2! change literature pays little attention to politicians' backgrounds. By contrast, students of representation find that legislators' background sometimes matters, but focus less on how its importance may vary over time on the same issue.
Theory
Scholars have long seen party and constituency as key determinants of politicians' policy stands. When issues turn from cross-cutting to partisan scholars understand this change as a shift from constituency to party cues (Carmines and Stimson 1989 , Bruce and Wilcox 1998 , Karol 2009 ), or do not seek to explain the pre-polarized stands (Adams 1997, Burns and Taylor, 2000) . Yet an elected official's personal background may predispose her to a position, independent of constituency factors.
While absent from the party position change/issue evolution literature, this claim is investigated in "descriptive representation" studies focused on race and gender (Swain 1993 , Mansbridge 1999 , Swers 2005 , Grose 2011 . Others examine the impact of religion (Fastnow, Grant and Rudolph 1999 , Yamane and Oldmixon 2006 , McTague and PearsonMerkowitz 2013 , military service (Gelpi and Feaver 2002) , parental status and smoking (Burden 2007) and class (Carnes 2013) . Scholars note that the importance of legislators' backgrounds may depend on an issue's salience, or its connection to the attribute in question. Effects also appear greater for legislative activities other than voting. Yet there is little suggestion that the weight of personal factors may vary over time for the same activity on the same issue. Many studies are cross-sectional or examine a brief period. Carnes (2013) finds little change in the role of class in Congress over decades. 1 We argue that changes in the composition of party coalitions can greatly affect the ! 3! importance of legislators' personal background for their position-taking. Scholars have long known that legislators' perceptions of their constituents' views are flawed (Miller and Stokes 1963) . When a new issue arises politicians may not easily ascertain their constituents' views and may project their own beliefs onto them. If beliefs are linked to characteristics like religion the latter may predict legislators' votes.
Even if they perceive constituents' views accurately, legislators' background may lead them to give greater weight to the perceived views of a "subconstituency" (Fenno 1978 , Bishin 2009 (Bawn et al 2012) are over-represented in activist and donor circles. Politicians seeking nomination will increasingly side with such groups on issues of great concern to them once their strength in the party becomes apparent. In such circumstances the importance ! 4! of the factor underlying officials' positions at the earlier pre-partisan stage -be it constituency or personal background -will decrease.
This will not be true for all elected officials. For some the stand that their personal background led them to emerges as the policy of their party, so these two identities are
reinforcing. Yet other politicians face a choice and many will side with their party and aligned interest groups, even if it means taking a stand at odds with those in their group and, in some cases, modifying a previous position. In such cases we can expect to see a weaker association between legislators' backgrounds and their policy stands.
The State Level
We assess this claim via an examination of abortion politics in California. A focus on California is useful for several reasons. The Golden State was among the first to liberalize its abortion law in 1967. Three other early movers (Georgia, Mississippi and North Carolina) did not have two party politics then so cannot inform a study of party position change. The final early-mover, Colorado, is both smaller and less well documented than California. The latter is a key concern when focusing on state politics where data availability for prior decades is far more limited than at the national level.
The state level is a valuable domain for studying party position change. In the American federal system many political controversies first emerge in the states. Some policies are initially seen as falling within the purview of state government. States' varied composition means that reformers often can place their concerns on the agenda of one or more states long before they are able to do so at the national level.
Yet the states' status as "laboratories of democracy" is more often viewed in the context of policy innovation than that of party position change. Studies of the latter focus ! 5! on national politics (Carmines and Stimson 1989 , Adams 1997 , Bruce and Wilcox 1998 , Burns and Taylor 2000 , Shoch 2001 , Wolbrecht 2000 , Sanbonmatsu 2002 , Mellow 2008 , Karol 2009 , Layman et al 2010 , Wolbrecht and Hartney 2014 . Recent exceptions focus on race in the post New Deal states (Chen 2009, Feinstein and Schickler 2008 Assemblymembers were more pro-choice than their non-Catholic colleagues.
Looking at partisan alignments also reveals change. The initially greater support for liberal abortion policies by Republican survey respondents was time-bound. The Field
Poll suggests that this shift occurred earlier in California before it did nationwide. In 1975 California Republican respondents were still more pro-choice, but by 1979 they were more pro-life than Democratic ones. 6 The timing of this reversal is not consistent with a view that shifts in the public drove change among elected officials since already in 1967 Democratic legislators were slightly more pro-choice. Rather, the chronology suggests, in line with the literature, that elite leadership of public opinion occurred.
Parties and Groups in California Abortion Politics
Our finding that legislators' religious affiliations declined in importance regarding abortion is consistent with our argument about legislators' reliance on personal cues in the absence of party ones. It is also consistent with the history of coalitional involvement in abortion politics over the same period, as we discuss below. Theories that stress the role of groups with intense policy preferences in shaping party policies (Bawn et al 2012) suggest that alignment of the groups active on an issue will determine whether dispute over it falls along or cuts across party lines. Neither doctors nor the Catholic Church were strongly aligned with a party in this period. Yet on ! 10! key concerns physicians had won more support from Republicans. The American Medical Association's opposition to Medicare was more widely shared among GOP politicians than Democratic ones, for example. Doctors also were probably mostly Republican voters during this period (Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995 Conventions along with most California GOP legislators took pro-life stands.
In sum, during the 1970s interest groups arose on both sides of the abortion debate rejected the compromise "leave it to the doctors" approach of California's 1967 law. These organizations and the broader constituencies for which they spoke eventually became aligned with the two parties, pulling Democratic and Republican elected official of all faiths in different directions on abortion.
Data
To understand what factors have shaped abortion voting as it turned from crosscutting to partisan we turn to several analyses based on legislators' votes on abortion over three decades. Our dependent variable is a scale based on votes on abortion in the State
Assembly during each term. The scale ranges from zero to one, with one signifying consistent support for abortion restriction by a legislator and zero consistent opposition.
After first collecting all recorded votes on bills mentioning abortion, we used principal components factor analysis to ensure that all votes incorporated in the measure tapped into a common dimension, discarding those that did not load on the same factor at .6 or greater. The number of votes on abortion varied from year to year, as did bills'
provisions. We list the bills, topics and votes underlying our scale in the appendix. To answer such questions multivariate analyses are required.
[ Table 1 about here]
In Table 1 we report OLS regression models based on Assemblymembers' voting on abortion for four periods: 1967-1968, 1977-1978, 1981-1982 and 1983-1984 . These are snapshots of a changing reality. The first one captures the earliest positioning on abortion by California legislators. The second is drawn from the 1970s when party and religious affiliations are both important predictors of legislators' votes. The third period reported is the first time in which partisanship was by far the dominant predictor. We also report results for one more period, after which minimal change occurs.
For each period we present three models, one focusing on party, another focusing on religion and a final one that includes both of these as well as other member and constituency characteristics. The second model for each period includes not only an indicator variable coded as 1 if the legislator was Catholic and 0 otherwise, but also the variable Church, which is the number of Catholic Churches in a district.
The third model reported for each period incorporates other legislator characteristics including race, gender and an indicator variable capturing whether the legislator was Jewish. In addition to the constituency-level variable of churches carried over from the second model, we also include a measure of the share of urban residents in districts, as well as a voter partisanship measure-the percentage of the vote received by the Democratic Presidential candidate in the previous election.
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Note that the number of observations on which the second and third models are based for each period is smaller than that in the first model. The religious affiliation of several legislators has proven elusive and we exclude them from our analyses.
In 1967 in the bivariate model party affiliation has a positive coefficient, meaning that from the beginning Republican legislators were more opposed to abortion rights than Democrats Yet this coefficient is small and party affiliation was not a significant predictor of Assemblymembers' votes on abortion in 1967.
By contrast, the coefficient for the Catholic indicator variable is both positive and significant, despite the smaller number of observations due to the lack of information regarding some legislators' religious affiliation. In this model the coefficient for the variable capturing the number of Catholic Churches in districts is close to zero however.
This suggests that the relationship between Catholicism and legislators' votes on abortion shown in Figure 1 was not driven by constituency factors. Rather, the legislator's own religious affiliation was key. Analyses not shown including an interaction term for churches and Catholic legislator found no significant interaction effect.
In the combined model the coefficient for the Catholic indicator variable actually grows. The only other significant relationship observed is negative; Assemblymembers from districts where the Democratic Presidential candidate (Johnson) had run better were less likely to take anti-abortion stands. This finding is unexpected in that both national surveys (Adams 1997) and California Field Polls show that Democratic respondents were slightly more pro-life than Republicans in the 1960s and 1970s. None of the other variables that reflect the growing diversity of the legislature are predictive in any models.
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In the models of the second period, 1977-1978, a decade after the passage of the Therapeutic Abortion Act and a few years after Roe, change is evident. Compared to 1967 the party coefficient doubles. The Catholic one is halved and falls just short of significance at the conventional level. The Catholic coefficient is again significant in the second multivariate model, however.
The results for the third period, 1981-1982, are interesting. In the years since the previous observations Reagan was elected President with a stronger pro-life stand than previous GOP Presidential nominees, helping to align the religious right with the GOP.
By this time party affiliation was strongly associated with legislators' abortion stands. In 1981 the Catholic coefficient changed sign; Catholics were more pro-choice than nonCatholics! Yet the multivariate model shows that controlling for party, race and district characteristics Catholics were still significantly more pro-life than others. This is obscured in models that do not include party, since Catholics were mostly Democrats.
In the final period, the chief difference observed again concerns the role of Catholicism. The negative coefficient is larger and significant for the first time. Yet once again the model incorporating all variables tells a different story. Catholicism remains associated with pro-life voting. Yet the coefficient is small and, for the first time statistically insignificant. As partisanship's importance grew, religion's declined. The negative association observed between Catholicism and opposition to abortion restrictions is a spurious result of Catholics' greater presence in the Democratic Caucus.
The irrelevance of legislators' Catholicism evident by 1983 in California was far ahead of developments in Congress where Catholics remained relatively pro-life into the 1990s (Tatalovich and Schier 1993 and Fastnow, Grant, and Rudolph 1999) . Similarly, using the highly aggregated NOMINATE measure, Poole (2007) concludes that Members of Congress "die with their ideological boots on", but Poole and Rosenthal (1997) concede that the association between their scores and some issues including abortion is not stable and that some incumbents changed their positions on that topic.
On the other hand, Wolbrecht (2000) accepts the premise that replacement is the leading mechanism of party position change, yet finds much adaptation by incumbents on women's rights issues in Congress. By contrast, Karol (2009) sees conversion as the chief ! 22! mechanism of change, while noting that that it might play a more limited role on issues like abortion, which are associated with the entry of new groups into party coalitions.
Yet not only do these studies reach divergent conclusions, they are all focused on Congress. So further exploration at the state level is useful. Table 2 [ Table 2 about Here] Table 2 reports the difference in party mean support for abortion restriction or limitation in the 1967-1968 and 1971-1972 legislatures, and the same statistic for 1977-1978 compared with 1981-1982 . As in previous figures and tables, the dependent variable is coded so that higher values mean more support for the "pro-life" side.
Comparing the change in the difference of party means reveals that it occurred not only in the Assembly as a whole, but also among the subset of legislators serving at the beginning and the end of each period. In other words, there was position change by incumbents on abortion. The change in the earlier period is less dramatic than the shift evident form 1977 through 1982, the period in which the religious right emerged. The shift is also smaller among continuing legislators than in the chamber as a whole, indicating that both conversion and turnover contributed to the growing party divide.
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[ Table 3 about Here]
Continuing a focus on behavioral change among legislators, Table 3 reports coefficients from multivariate OLS models for the same groups and time periods explored in Table 2 . In both cases we see a decline in the coefficient for the Catholic indicator variable and an increase in the Party coefficient. As in Table 2 , the same basic trend is evident among continuing legislators, as well as chamber-wide, even if the shift is smaller among the veteran Assemblymembers.
Discussion
We have shown how abortion became a partisan issue in California. When legislators faced a new issue their religious affiliations were initially more important than their party ties or district characteristics. Yet the effect of religion faded during the 1970s and was gone by the mid 1980s. The issue saw a shift from personal background cues to partisan ones, not, as is typical in the study of party position change, one from district cues to party ones. This shift coincided with the incorporation of interest groups focused on abortion in both parties' coalitions; feminists in the Democratic Party and the religious right in the GOP, changes which altered the political incentives of legislators.
Other trends were evident in the Assembly in this era including an increase in overall polarization. Yet the abortion issue had its own dynamic. The growing diversity in a body that was heavily white and male at the beginning of the period we explored is also notable. Yet this development, much of which postdates the shift we observe, was not a key factor in polarizing abortion politics in California. 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 Labor Issues Abortion Polarization on Labor Issues and Abortion, California State Assembly 1957-1996 Figure 3 
